

ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

INSTRUCTOR | Edward Tingley, PhD

READING FOR SECTION 5 | LESSON 1

Excerpt from:

Plato, Republic, book VII

360 BC

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

[Http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/republic.8.vii.html](http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/republic.8.vii.html)

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE | Socrates, Glaucon

SCENE | The prison holding Socrates, in Phlius

At these points (☞) remarks are offered that might be of use. — Edward Tingley

§ 1

Socrates. And now let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: — Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

Glaucon. I see.

Socrates. And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear

over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

Glaucon. You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Socrates. Like ourselves; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

Glaucon. True; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

Socrates. And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Glaucon. Yes.

Socrates. And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Glaucon. Very true.

Socrates. And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

Glaucon. No question.

Socrates. To them the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

Glaucon. That is certain.

§ 2

Socrates. And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains;¹ the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive someone saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision – what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them – will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Glaucon. Far truer.

Socrates. And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

Glaucon. True.

Socrates. And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged

ascent, and held fast until he's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.²

Glaucon. Not all in a moment.

Socrates. He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Glaucon. Certainly.

Socrates. Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Glaucon. Certainly.

Socrates. He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Glaucon. Clearly he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

§ 3

Socrates. And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Glaucon. Certainly, he would.

Socrates. And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the

1 This is one of the two "bewilderments of the eyes" noted later in § 5 ("going into the light").

2 That "bewilderment of the eyes" again.

passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,'

and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Glaucou. Yes I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Socrates. Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation;³ would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?⁴

Glaucou. To be sure.

Socrates. And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

Glaucou. No question.

§ 4

Socrates. This entire allegory you may now append, dear Glaucou, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my

poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life, must have his eye fixed.

Glaucou. I agree as far as I am able to understand you.

Socrates. Moreover, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Glaucou. Yes, very natural.

Socrates. And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Glaucou. Anything but surprising.

§ 5

Socrates. Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any

³ This is a person led back to the cave after being "forced into the presence of the sun himself" and growing "accustomed to the sight of the upper world."

⁴ This is the other of the two "bewilderments of the eyes" of § 5 ("coming out of the light").

one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

Glaucon. That is a very just distinction.

§ 6

☞ Plato here introduces a conclusion about man's nature, saying a "power and capacity exists in the soul," one not 'naturally active' but latent. When that power is activated the human soul is "turned from the world of becoming into that of being."

Socrates. But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

Glaucon. They undoubtedly say this.

Socrates. Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

Glaucon. Very true.

Socrates. And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

Glaucon. Yes, such an art may be presumed.

☞ By 'art' here understand a kind of *know-how*, oriented to an achievement, like the art of flute playing or farming. This involves both *understanding* (something must be known about how to play, how to achieve the good of farming) and *activity* (something must be done to acquire the ability to play, to achieve the goal).

Socrates. And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue – how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness.

Glaucon. Very true.

☞ Why is a kind of wisdom "rendered ... hurtful and useless"? This part of the discussion involves the interaction of those who have 'seen the light' with those who have not. Plato means the uselessness of the knowledge of the sun (knowledge of the good) to those committed to the reality of the cave (where no one knows of the sun). This was already noted in § 5, where Plato counts this particular "bewilderment of the eyes" ("coming out of the light") to be a deficiency or disadvantage.

With regard to the "hurtful" quality of 'enlightenment' (§ 1), consider Athens' view of Socrates. He *harms* the citizens, and so he suffers harm. What good did his understanding do him, or anyone?

§ 7

Socrates. But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below – if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Glaucon. Very likely.

Socrates. Yes; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

Glaucon. Very true.

Socrates. Then the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all – they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

Glaucon. What do you mean?

Socrates. I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.⁵

Glaucon. But is not this unjust? Ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

Socrates. You have again forgotten, my friend, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together

by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.... Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others;....

[...]

§ 8

Socrates. Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

Glaucon. True.

Socrates. But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, ... – this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world – this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.

Glaucon. I agree in what you are saying, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and again.

[...]

Socrates. I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this,....

⁵ That is, compared to the delight or happiness afforded by the vision attained above, “where they desire to dwell,” the

activities back in the cave are pleasureless – but socially essential for the reason now to be given.